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Secrecy Nurtures Disease: Balancing Privacy Concerns with COVID-19 Contact-Tracing
Measures
Julianna Dzwierzynski*
I.

Introduction

In December 2019, the novel coronavirus disease (“COVID-19”) first emerged in Wuhan,
China and rapidly progressed to a global pandemic by early 2020.1 To date, over one hundred and
fifteen million cases have been reported and over two and a half million deaths have been recorded
globally.2 In the United States alone, more than 32,736,063 people have been infected and at least
581,302 have died.3 As conditions worsen and case numbers continue to spike, American life has
been fundamentally altered. In an effort to help slow the spread of COVID-19 around the world,
various digital contact-tracing measures have emerged.
Contact tracing is a method to delay the spread of infectious diseases.4 Traditionally, in
communities utilizing contact tracing, hospitals and labs send names of individuals who have been
recently diagnosed with COVID-19 to local health departments.5 The health department then
notifies others who may have been exposed to the virus as a result of being in close proximity with
the infected individual.6 COVID-19 patients are often contagious despite being asymptomatic,
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J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Marquette University.
Identifying the Outbreak Source, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (July 1, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/about-epidemiology/identifying-source-outbreak.html.
2 Johns Hopkins University of Medicine Coronavirus Resource Center, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (Last
updated Mar. 4, 2021).
3
Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (May. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html.
4 William F. Marshall, Contact tracing and COVID-19: What is it and How Does it Work?, M AYO C LINIC (Nov. 3,
2020),
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/coronavirus/expert-answers/covid-19-contact-tracing/faq20488330.
5 Id.
6 Id.
1
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accelerating its transmissibility.7 As COVID-19 spreads rapidly, the time consuming and laborintensive traditional methods of contact tracing proved to be insufficient in managing the increase
of cases. Tech giants, like Apple and Google, have partnered with public health authorities across
the globe to build application programming interfaces (“APIs”), as a modern enhancement to track
the spread of the virus, find new infections, and support the reopening of global economies.8 While
most countries promptly implemented some form of a contact tracing app, such apps have made
slow progress throughout the United States. 9 According to public-health experts, part of the
problem has been lack of coordination by the federal government, wariness of investing resources
in an unproven solution, and an overarching lack of trust in technology companies. 10
These apps pose several privacy threats related to potential overreach, discrimination, and
voluntariness. Moreover, developers have not yet addressed whether an exit strategy exists to
sunset the data after the pandemic ends. The escalation of the pandemic has raised questions about
whether governments are prepared to navigate these various privacy issues as they take on greater
roles in collecting individuals’ data.11
The global pandemic is not a singular problem with a perfect solution. Rather, how
governments operate through technology is integral in addressing the public health crisis. If
governments are to operate through technology, they must acknowledge the limitations of
accountability in technology as we put civil and political liberties on the line. In balancing the
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Seyed M. Moghadas et al., The Implications of Silent Transmission for the Control of COVID-19 Outbreaks, 30
PNAS 1, 1 (2020) (“Silent disease transmission during the presymptomatic and asymptomatic stages are responsible
for more than 50% of the overall attach rate in COVID-19 outbreaks.”).
8 Jessica Davis, COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps Spotlight Privacy, Security Rights, H EALTH IT SECURITY (May 20,
2020), https://healthitsecurity.com/news/covid-19-contact-tracing-apps-spotlight-privacy-security-rights.
9 Alejandro de la Garza, Contact Tracing Apps Were Big Tech’s Best Idea for Fighting COVID-19. Why Haven’t They
Helped?, TIME (Nov. 10, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://time.com/5905772/covid -19-contact-tracing-apps/.
10 Id.
11 See generally Aaron J. Burnstein, Privacy and Data Use in U.S. Government Responses to COVID-19, AM. BAR
ASS’N:
ANTITRUST
(Summer
2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/digital-assetabstract.html/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_magazine/atmag-summer2020/smmr20-burstein.pdf.
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integral nature of contact tracing apps to track and stop the spread of COVID-19 (or future
pandemics) with the various privacy concerns they involve, this Comment will propose that the
best solution is for state governments to adopt a voluntary use of a less invasive, decentralized
model and place limitations on data storage periods. Governments need to be transparent about
the gaps in data and the mechanisms for ensuring systems are not being built on inaccurate data.
Moreover, in constructing an exit strategy for stored data, state governments and app developers
must implement a means to guard against function creep, ensuring our data is relevant to the
current state of affairs in terms of public health and safety during COVID-19. While use of data
for research could be useful in the long term, we need to balance the need for research purposes
with stricter controls of data deletion after a certain period of time.
Part II of this Comment takes a historical look at contact tracing and explores the
development of both the centralized and decentralized models of digital contact-tracing apps.
Additionally, Part II will examine comparative contact-tracing models used in other countries.
Part III explains the various privacy threats that digital contact-tracing apps implicate including
overreach, anonymity, location tracking, voluntariness, consent, technological limitations, and exit
strategy. Part IV examines current privacy law as it has developed since the HIV/AIDS crisis and
location tracing law. Finally, Part V proposes what changes should be made to privacy law to
address the unique situation of these apps with regard to COVID-19 and with regard to future
pandemics. Ultimately, this Comment will argue that these apps pose grave privacy threats that
can be alleviated by state governments partnering with tech developers to institute a decentralized
app that encourages participation to combat the spread of COVID-19.

4

II.

Different Application Models

In Part I, this Comment first establishes the basic history of contact tracing and its
transition to a digital format in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic. Then this section will
describe the differences between the centralized and decentralized application models and the
benefits and downfalls of both. Further, this section will elaborate on the unveiling of the
Google/Apple partnership and how their development of the Exposure Notification System
(“ENS”) works to enable a broader Bluetooth-based contact tracing platform as a more robust
solution than an API and would allow more individuals to participate if they choose to opt -in.
Finally, this section will describe various contact-tracing models and mass surveillance
applications used in other countries.
A. History of Contact-Tracing
Contact tracing is a well-established and essential tool for public health officials to combat the
spread of infectious diseases.12 Historically, contact tracing has been conducted through the efforts
of skilled workers who conduct interviews, contact at-risk individuals, and counsel individuals
through a quarantine period, if necessary.13 Contact tracing refers to “the process of identification
of contacts who may have come in contact with an infected victim and subsequent collection of
further information about these contacts.”14 In practice, contact tracing is performed for a variety
of diseases: sexually transmitted infections (including HIV) and viral infections.15 The overall
purpose of contact tracing as a solution is two-fold. First, at a global level, contact-tracing aids

12

Hyunghoon Cho et al., Contact Tracing Mobile Apps for COVID-19: Privacy Considerations and Related Tradeoffs, at 1 (2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.11511.pdf ; see also Leonie Reichert et al., Privacy-Preserving Contact
Tracing of COVID-19 Patients (2020), https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/375.pdf (“Contact tracing deals with finding
unreported infected people by tracing back who could have possibly caught the disease from a verified case.”).
13 Natalie Ram & David Gray, Mass Surveillance in the Age of COVID-19, 7 J. LAW B IOSCI 1, 11 (2020).
14 Qiang Tang, Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing: Current Solutions and Open Questions, at 4 (2020),
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/426.pdf
15 Id.
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medical personnel in tracing the origin and pattern of the virus to take appropriate actions and craft
strategies (i.e., enforcing social distancing, lockdowns, etc.) to fight against the virus and future
pandemics.16 Second, at an individual level, contact-tracing aids medical personnel in alerting
specific individuals who are at risk of infection and allow them to evaluate how to take further
action.17 Given the unique attributes of COVID-19 and its ability to be spread either through direct
or indirect contacts, recent modelling data comparing traditional methods of contact tracing and
those of digital contact tracing have indicated that COVID-19 spreads too quickly to be
controllable through traditional methods.18 In contrast, digital contact tracing may be overbroad
and too impersonal, rendering it a less effective means than traditional contact-tracing in
generating compliance.19
B. Fragmented U.S. Strategy
Particularly in the U.S., in the absence of a unified federal strategy, tracing efforts lag and the
country leads the world with over 32.5 million infections and 581,302 deaths.20 Without a national
strategy, states are required to take their own approaches. At least twenty states developed their
own contact-tracing apps to supplement deficiencies in traditional contact-tracing capabilities.21
Many states, however, refuse to develop contact-tracing apps in response to privacy concerns.22

16

Id. at 5.
Id.
18 Ram & Gray, supra note 13, at 10; see also Reichert, supra note 12, at 1 (“The current COVID-19 pandemic shows
the necessity to automate contact tracing to quickly discover new infections and slow down the spreading.”); Devin
Skoll et al., COVID-19 Testing and Infection Surveillance: Is a Combined Digital Contact-Tracing and Mass-Testing
Solution Feasible in the United States?, 1 CARDIOVASCULAR DIGITAL HEALTH J. 149, 153–54 (2020) (“Contact tracing
alone is insufficient to control COVID-19 transmission without complementary large-scale testing to identify COVID19 carriers . . . increasing the frequency of testing would improve accuracy while less expensive equipment would
expand its distribution to identify more cases, thus accelerating the speed of results required to prompt individuals to
quarantine without delay.”).
19 Ram & Gray, supra note 13, at 11–12 (“[D]epending on precision of location data, prompts to self -isolate may
become overbroad and routine, which will further reduce compliance.”).
20
Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (May. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html.
21 Id.
22 Id.
17
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The gaps at both the national and state levels have prompted cities and private corporations (i.e.,
Uber and university systems) to develop their own contact-tracing strategies, further fragmenting
the system and inhibiting the Department of Health’s ability to adequately combat COVID-19.23
The U.S. public demonstrates wariness in embracing these new digital developments putting
possible public health gains second to the loss of privacy and civil liberties. 24 The fragmented
implementation of contact-tracing apps, public wariness over privacy concerns, and lack of
testing/manual contact-tracing casts doubt on whether the U.S. will be able to successfully employ
technology produced by its own technology giants. 25
C. Centralized (Data-First) versus Decentralized (Privacy-First)
Worldwide, approximately eighty contact tracing apps have been developed to combat
COVID-19 by tracking when two devices come into close contact with one another. 26 One of the
most salient differences in development of these various models is the divide between “data-first”
models which “prioritize the retention of tracking data and its availability to health authorities and
researchers,” and “privacy-first” approaches, which emphasize individuals’ “control over their
own data and seek to provide an effective degree of contact tracing without exposing identifiable
individuals’ movements and interactions to authorities.” 27 At the most basic level, functionality
of these approaches is the same in that “an alert can be issued across the network when an
individual tests positive for COVID-19,” either by direct alert from health authorities or by the

23

Id.
Id. at 5 (“In a June 2020 survey from Avira, 71% of Americans did not plan to download a contact-tracing
application, citing privacy as a primary concern, and there is an ideological opposition by some to any form of tracing.
Much of this stems from concern about data safety and long-term use.”).
25 Id.
26 Samual A. Garner, US Privacy Law and Contact Tracing Apps: Considerations for Mitigating Risk , BCLP (July 6,
2020),
https://www.bclplaw.com/en-US/insights/us-privacy-law-and-contact-tracing-apps-considerations-formitigating-risk.html.
27 Robert A. Fahey & Airo Hino, COVID-19, Digital Privacy, and the Social Limits on Data-Focused Public Health
Responses, 55 I NT’L J. I NFO. M GMT 1, 2 (2020).
24
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individual who tested positive for COVID-19 entering a particular code on their device (i.e.
smartphone) to alert anyone who may have been exposed.28
Apart from this most basic function, the design of the two different applications diverges in
how they identify and contact individuals who come in contact with the virus. The centralized or
“data-first” model allows health authorities to directly identify and contact potentially exposed
individuals.29

Alternatively, the decentralized or “privacy-first” model does not identify

individuals who opt-in and only notifies them on their smartphones, leaving the decision to get
tested in the hands of the individual.30
The centralized approach is designed to gather the anonymous phone ID code of someone who
has tested positive as well as the ID codes of their close contacts and deposit all information in a
central server that is operated by the government and protected by cybersecurity measures to
conduct contact-tracing, perform analysis, and generate necessary alerts. 31 In this structure, an
individual user must sign up to central server which automatically creates a “privacy-preserving
Temporary ID (TempID)32 for each of the registered devices.”33 Devices exchange these private
TempIDs through “Bluetooth encounters messages” as they pass by one another or come into close
contact.34 Then, if a user tests positive for COVID-19, the server maps the TempIDs from all
Bluetooth encounter messages to detect contacts that may be at risk. 35 This centralized approach
appears to be an invaluable resource for data scientists and health officials researching COVID-19

28

Id.
Id.
30 Id.
31 Skoll, supra note 18, at 153.
32 This TempID is encrypted with a key known only to the central server’s authority.
33 Molla R. Hussein et al., Digital Surveillance Systems for Tracing COVID-19: Privacy and Security Challenges with
Recommendations 2 (July 26, 2020) (unpublished manuscript).
34 Id.
35 Id.
29
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and mechanisms to manage future epidemics more generally. 36 While this method enables health
officials to “view networks of contacts and better identify super spreaders,” as it generates a large
quantity of data on the movement of and contacts between individuals, it also puts individuals at
risk for data breaches and potential overreach as “data enables future possibility of state
surveillance.”37
The decentralized model, on the other hand, is designed such that only an individual user’s ID
is sent to a centralized database and the phone then downloads data and content matches locally.38
In other words, the decentralized model gives users more control over their information. A higher
degree of privacy is implemented as the database of users who have tested positive is routinely
downloaded onto a smartphone, and if a match occurs, the user then receives an exposure
notification directly to their phone.39 The decentralized model serves as a “bulletin board” for the
required lookup of exposure information, ensuring user privacy by creating anonymous identifiers
inside smartphones or other user devices—keeping real identities secret from both the central
server and other users.40 While decentralized apps remedy concerns about user privacy, their
function can hinder the broader effect of contact tracing. Keeping contacts anonymous in this way
hinders progress by health officials in assuring the correct people are getting notified.41
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Fahey & Hino, supra note 27.
Skoll, supra note 18, at 150; see also Young E. Saw et al., Towards a Digital Solution: Predicting Public Take-up
of Singapore’s Contact Tracing Mobile Application During the COVID-19 Crisis (Sept. 1, 2020) (“Although this
method comes with costs to users’ privacy, it enables public health agencies to detect community spread.”).
38 Skoll, supra note 18, at 150.
39 Saw, supra note 37; see also, Elissa Redmiles, Concerns and Tradeoffs in Technology-Facilitated Contact Tracing,
2 DIGITAL GOV’T: RES. AND PRACTICE 1, 2 (2020) (“[U]sers’ apps periodically generate anonymized identifiers for
them, which are broadcast to other apps within a given distance at periodic time intervals. Apps whose u sers have
reported that they have tested positive for COVID-19 push a list of exposed contact identifiers to a public list . . . the
other decentralized apps periodically pull this public list and check if they have any matches; if so, they notify the user
that they have been exposed.”).
40 Hussein et al., supra note 33.
41 Skoll, supra note 18, at 150.
37
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On April 10, 2020, Google and Apple announced their joint effort to construct a decentralized
ENS contact-tracing application for iPhone and Android devices. 42 The Apple/Google API
responded to the several of the gravest privacy concerns by combining random identification
numbers so no personally identifiable data is exchanged, an opt-in system to acquire consent, and
utilizing a decentralized model to store and process data on users’ devices.43 This ENS system
enables apps made by national public health authorities to use Bluetooth in the background such
that when “phones come into contact, each phone generates a random numerical ID that it
broadcasts to nearby phones” to preserve anonymity.44 The Apple/Google partnership posited a
design that had desirable security properties. Rather than tracking users’ location, the ENS app
uses Bluetooth signal to connect with nearby devices.45 Moreover, Google and Apple are using
better encryption methods by scrambling identifying information and protecting any potentially
identifiable information related to the device.46 Apple and Google have stated that “only apps
designated by public health authorities will have access to this framework and such apps must
meet specific criteria around privacy, security, and data control.” 47 The tech giant duo rebranded
their voluntary app as an “exposure notification system” rather than a contract-tracing solution and
made promises to dismantle the system at the end of the pandemic.48 Several privacy researchers
cautiously welcomed the new ENS framework as it “provided assurances over short-term COVID-

42

Laura Bradford, COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps: A Stress Test for Privacy, the GDPR, and Data Protection
Regimes, 7 J. L. BIOSCI 1, 2 (2020).
43 Tamar Sharon, Blind-sided by Privacy? Digital Contact Tracing, the Apple/Google API and Big Tech’s Newfound
Role as Global Health Policy Makers, at 3 (2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7368642/pdf/10676_2020_Article_9547.pdf .
44 Skoll, supra note 18, at 150.
45 Garner, supra note 26; see generally Nicole Martinez-Martin et al., Digital Contact Tracing, Privacy, and Public
Health, Hastings Center Report, (May-June 2020) (explaining the general concept behind use of Bluetooth technology
to register proximity between phones of people diagnosed with COVID-19 and other smartphone users).
46 Garner, supra note 26.
47 Bradford, supra note 42, at 3.
48 Garner, supra note 26.
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19 surveillance and centralized data breach concerns,” but they were “wary of the obviously
unchecked and potentially uncheckable power of these platforms.” 49
The ENS framework generates and collects four types of information: (1) Bluetooth identifier
codes and associated contact event information; (2) positive diagnosis information; (3) associated
information (when an individual notifies via the app that they have the virus, their individual IP
address and other metadata will be detectable); and (4) notifications to exposed users.50 A potential
fifth category of data collection includes gathering “a combination of the exposure data collected
by the apps using the Google/Apple ENS with individual user identities and location data in order
to (1) assist law enforcement to ensure quarantine of infected and/or exposed individuals; (2) use
location data in aggregate to track the spread of the virus across a population; or (3) use individual
exposure data to make inferences about health.”51 Apple and Google, however, designed their
ENS framework to make automated collected of this last category extremely difficult. 52
D. Comparative Models
While it is hopeful that the ENS framework accelerates progress with regards to generating
and tracking COVID-19 information, several other countries were quick to adopt their own
models. Some countries like China, South Korea, Israel, and Singapore quickly adopted systems
that fail to take their citizens’ privacy into consideration. 53 China initially adopted a variety of
tools to contain the spread of COVID-19 including the mandated use of a mobile smartphone
application (Health Code), which generates a rating indicating the likelihood of an individual’s

49

M ICHAEL VEALE, SOVEREIGNTY, PRIVACY, AND CONTACT TRACING PROTOCOLS; DATA, JUSTICE, AND COVID-19
34 (L. Taylor et al. eds., 2020).
50 Bradford, supra note 42, at 4.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Reichert, supra note 12.

11

exposure to the virus and dictates whether individuals can walk freely or not.54 Additionally, there
are hundreds of millions of cameras equipped with facial recognition to enable contact tracing
efforts and identify quarantine violations. 55 China’s mass surveillance program combined with
mass testing has been greatly effective in preventing a second wave of infections. 56
In South Korea, the government has maintained a public database of known COVID patients,
which includes information about their age, gender, occupation, and travel routes. 57 South Korea
responded to COVID by transparently communicating information through emergency phone
alerts which contained details of new cases. Citizens who were willing to wear masks and
cooperate with contact tracers accepted this system and acknowledged privacy would be a requisite
tradeoff.58 Moreover, the epidemiological intelligence officers monitor GPS data, CCTV footage,
credit card transaction data, and travel information to ensure that infected individuals or those
under ordered quarantine would comply. 59
Israel, in a different way, opted to rely on “domestic security service—an arguably extreme
approach that is at odds with other democracies and constitutes an unprecedented privacy
violation, but lays groundwork for invasive surveillance tools.”60 Israel’s Security Agency was
permitted to share “the name, ID number, cellphone number, internet browsing history, and every
voice call and text message of confirmed COVID-19 patients.”61 The command-and-control

54

Aditi Bhandari & Simon Scarr, Reopening a Megacity, REUTERS GRAPHICS (June 4, 2020),
https://graphics.reuters.com/HEALTH-CORONAVIRUS/WUHAN/rlgpdkxzavo/index.html.
55 Skoll supra note 18, at 151.
56 Talha Burki, China’s Successful Control of COVID-19, 20 THE LANCET 1240, 1240–1241 (2020),
https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/laninf/PIIS1473-3099(20)30800-8.pdf (“As of Oct 4, 2020, China had
confirmed 90,604 cases of COVID-19 and 4,739 deaths, while the USA had registered 7,382,194 cases and 209,382
deaths.”).
57 Cho, supra note 12, at 1.
58 Skoll, supra note 18, at 151.
59 Id.
60 Tehilla S. Altshuler & Rachel A. Hershkowitz, How Israel’s COVID-19 Mass Surveillance Operation Works,
BROOKINGS (July 6, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-israels-covid-19-mass-surveillanceoperation-works/.
61 Id.
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approach relies on a classified database known as “The Tool,” which collects cellular data about
location, antenna zone, text messages, call history, and internet browsing history. 62 The program
harvests metadata without consent, setting a dangerous precedent for use of overly intrusive
mechanisms to combat public health crises.63
Finally, Singapore was the first country to deploy a national contact-tracing app.64 On March
20, 2020, the Singapore government released a centralized application model called
“TraceTogether,” developed by Singapore’s Government Technology Agency. 65 TraceTogether
exchanges Bluetooth signals between devices in close proximity to detect other TraceTogether
users.66 The aim of the app is to quarantine people more efficiently; however, the technology is
not working as the government had hoped.67 Approximately 35% of the population has the app
downloaded, but, by using Bluetooth to permit devices to exchange codes, Bluetooth must be
enabled at all times which causes an immense drain on the device battery.68 While Singapore is
not employing the same mass surveillance measures that the aforementioned countries are, the
TraceTogether technology has posed serious privacy concerns with respect to the government’s
access to the data.69 If a user tests positive, “health officials will ask them to release their data on
the app” so the government can construct a list of other people the user has been in contact with.70
Moreover, the technology has since developed into a wearable contact tracing piece of

62

Id.
Id.
64 Saira Asher, TraceTogether: Singapore Turns to Wearable Contact-tracing Covid Tech, BBC NEWS (July 4, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53146360.
65 Singapore Government Agency Website, https://www.tracetogether.gov.sg/common/privacystatement (last visited
Jan. 20, 2021).
66 Dean Koh, Singapore Government Launches New App for Contact Tracing to Combat Spread of COVID-19,
M OBIH EALTHNEWS (March 20, 2020), https://www.mobihealthnews.com/news/asia-pacific/singapore-governmentlaunches-new-app-contact-tracing-combat-spread-covid-19.
67 Asher, supra note 64.
68 Id.
69 Cho, supra note 12, at 2.
70 Id.
63
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technology.71 This small device, referred to as a “Token,” complements the existing contacttracing app to aid in identifying people who may have been infected or who have already tested
positive for the virus.72 To use the device, a user must provide their national ID and phone
number.73 If a user tests positive, “they have to hand their device to the Ministry of Health
because—unlike the app—they cannot transmit data over the internet.”74 Contact tracers then use
los to identify others who may be infected. 75
III.

Privacy Threats

Subsection A explains the privacy concerns of overreach and anonymity as a result of
implementing digital contact-tracing applications with a focus on the latent risk that data will be
used in the future for purposes not disclosed at collection. Subsection B will then focus on the
invasive nature of location tracking that are exacerbated by digital contact-tracing efforts.
Subsection C will explore the concerns of voluntariness and user consent to what these apps are
asking them to disclose. Finally, Subsection D examines the uncertain exit strategy that exists as
nothing more but conjecture and elusive promises.
A. Overreach and Anonymity
The tradeoff between surveillance and overreach is a complicated balancing act.

The

graduation from traditional methods of contact-tracing to digital contact tracing has unveiled
several security interests. Merely eliminating personal identification information (“PII”) or only
using an anonymous ID code, however, is insufficient privacy assurance.76 Moreover, other data
privacy risks include “transparency about the purpose of collecting information, the retention

71

Asher, supra note 64.
Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Hussein et al., supra note 33, at 3.
72
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period, safeguarding the data, restricting access to the data, and employing anonymization
techniques.”77 Intervention of contact-tracing apps raises ethical questions about just what civil
liberties users are laying on the line and thus implicates careful oversight by an inclusive advisory
body.78 With specific regard to anonymity, Apple and Google, for example, have claimed that
their user data “has been ‘anonymized’ by virtue of deidentification and decentralization.”79 Under
the GDPR,80 information is anonymized if “the information cannot be associated with a natural
individual.”81 Even more, “a large range of techniques exist to re-identify individuals using
seemingly anonymous information.”82
Among other countries and including the United States, citizens have been restricted to socialdistancing policies in the interest of public health. The further collection of personal information
via digital contact tracing necessitates balancing the tradeoff of individual liberty interests beyond
just protection of informational privacy.83 Data protection in the broader public health framework
is increasingly more crucial as countries generate and adopt different contact-tracing frameworks
or applications. Effectively, a critical decision for healthcare systems using these apps is whether
data is stored in central repositories or stored locally (decentralized). Because government
tracking of the virus is more effective when adopting centralized models, there are additional
privacy concerns as the government would have access to “citizen’s location data, the ‘social

77

Todd Ehret, Data Privacy Laws Collide with Contact Tracing Efforts; Privacy is Prevailing, REUTERS (July 21,
2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-data-privacy-contact-tracing/data-privacy-laws-collide-withcontact-tracing-efforts-privacy-is-prevailing-idUSKCN24M1NL.
78 Ferretti et al., Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Suggests Epidemic Control with Digital Contact Tracing, 368
Science 1, 5 (2020).
79 Bradford, supra note 42, at 6.
80 The General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) is the toughest privacy and security law in the world. It imposes
obligations onto organizations anywhere, so long as they target or co llect data related to people in the EU.
81 Bradford, supra note 42, at 6.
82 Id.
83 Martinez-Martin et al., supra note 45.
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graph’ of all physical contacts, and any other data the app is able to access from the phone. 84 In
the United States, there is no federal privacy law so “transparency could be up to the developers’
discretion” in creating these apps.
It is difficult to control overreach but if we are to invite the innovative tech industry to a
partnership with the government, it must also come with internal audits and risk assessment into
how individuals’ data is being used. If the data is to be aggregated for the benefit of researchers
and health authorities, such action exceeds the scope of what users are agreeing to by having their
data collected under the assumption it is only to be used in the wake of a public health crisis.
Especially in the United States, it is important to remember that “the data in question is the personal
data of citizens—and in recording all of their contact interactions (and in some cases, all of their
movements), it represents arguably the most personal and intimate data a government has ever
sought to gather about its own citizens.”85 The importance of privacy rests on the idea that even
if privacy is not a fundamental right, it is necessary to protect other fundamental rights. To “lose
control of personal information is to lose control of who we are and who we can be in relation to
the rest of society,” and moreover, privacy is necessary as a “safeguard of freedom in the
relationships between individuals and groups.”86
In the U.S. context, questions about protecting privacy against threats of governmental
surveillance implicate the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees “the right of people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated.”87 It should be noted that the Fourth Amendment applies only to the government and

84

Id.
Fahey & Hino, supra note 27, at 3.
86 Michael McFarland, Why We Care About Privacy, M ARKKULA C TR FOR APPLIED ETHICS (June 1, 2012),
https://www.scu.edu/ethics/focus-areas/internet-ethics/resources/why-we-care-about-privacy/; see generally Samuel
D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 5 H ARV. L. REV. 93 (1890) (expressing concern with social
pressure caused by excessive exposure to public scrutiny of the private affairs of individuals.).
87 U.S. Const., amend. IV.
85
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not private entities. Based on the surveillance programs implemented in other countries, “data
aggregation for contact tracing has been and will be conducted by private entities, principally
cellphone service providers and technology companies with access to location data through apps
installed on users’ devices.88 With respect to data collection, as early as the 1990s, “concerns were
voiced over the ‘dossier’ effect whereby the collection of large numbers of seemingly innocuous
data points could create a combined data set with a startling amount of personal information that
is easily deanonymized and attached to an individual citizen.”89 Since, the problem still remains
at issue. Now, in the context of public health or under the guise of a public health crisis, there are
suspicions and mistrust in both the large tech industries and the government that make progress in
stopping the virus rather arduous.
B. Location Tracking
Digital contact tracing turns citizens’ own smartphones into contact tracing devices making it
easier to track their movements and social contacts with a heightened degree of precision. 90 It is
also faster, more efficient, less labor-intensive, and less prone to human error.91 Still, this format
relies on the precise geolocation tracking and retention. When users install a contact-tracing app
on a mobile device, they are prompted to enable the existing location services on that device, thus
permitting the app to continuously record his or her location.92 Typically, contact tracing requires
collection of both Bluetooth and GPS data when a user comes in close proximity to another user.93
Given digital contact tracing is unlikely to yield its promised benefits, policymakers must
“ensure that screening, testing, and isolating of affected individuals” is done before requesting or
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requiring individuals sacrifice their locational and associational information.94 Using proximity
data rather than location data coupled with keeping “digital location trails” out of the government’s
hands could minimize the intrusiveness of gathered data and would further mitigate the privacy
threats of contact tracing program.95 To encourage trust, epidemiological surveillance programs
should gather only the minimum type of data “reasonably necessary to facilitate their public health
goals.”96
In designing a contact tracing solution, “the main anchor is location data” which can be
generated and collected in many ways (i.e., GPS, WIFI, Telcom Cell Towers, Bluetooth
beacons).97 Location data can be categorized in two groups: absolute location data and relative
location data. First, absolute location data is “GPS location, location with respect to static WIFI
access points, and Telcom cell towers,” and data points are often “written in the form of
geolocation coordinate pair.”98 Second, relative location data is generated from the “pairing of
two Bluetooth-enabled devices,” in which case there is some “reference description about the
location.”99
While large tech companies like Google and Apple promise not to track location data, any data
stored on an individual’s phone is by definition, “related” to an individual. The unique identifiers
broadcast by the ENS can easily be linked to natural persons because “geolocation tracking
systems already present on most user devices could reassociate the Bluetooth beacon identifiers
with particular devices.100

The privacy concerns of digital location tracking are further

exacerbated the longer tracking data remains available to government agents. The Supreme Court
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has recognized that the nature of storing digital location tracking is “inconsistent with a central
aim of the Framers.”101 While it is true that most location tracking data is obtained from individual
movements in public, information “deduced from the analysis of the aggregated public data does
not need to be.”102
The Supreme Court has further rejected “any notion that technological enhancement matters
to the constitutional treatment of location tracking.” 103 Rather, “such surveillance in public spaces
is equivalent to a ‘human tail’ and thus is not regulated by the Fourth Amendment.”104 In the 1967
Katz v. United States decision, the Court understood the Fourth Amendment insinuated that a
person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” was the boundary line of protection. 105 In a postKatz world, however, the notion of a privacy expectation has evolved and has broadened the
physical invasion test courts used prior to deciding Katz.106 Since, the Court has infused elasticity
into the privacy expectation analysis as explained by Justice Harlan: “the trespass-based
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is in, the present day, bad physics, for reasonable
expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion.” 107
In the Court’s 2018 decision in Carpenter v. United States, the Court held that “the Fourth
Amendment governs law enforcement access to historical cell site location gathered and stored by
cellphone service providers (cellphone location data, whether in the form of cell site location or
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GPS tracking), appears to be a centerpiece of tracing and proximity surveillance proposals because
these devices are so often with their users.”108 Moreover, this holding established that individuals
have the right to expect that “the whole of their physical movements” will remain private.109
Location data from smartphones and cellphones “provide an intimate window into a person’s life,
revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations.110 Even though this decision was applicable only to government
actors, the case’s particular holding on the sensitivity of location data will likely have wide-ranging
implications for private companies’ privacy programs. The Court further explained that their
holding with regards to cell site location information (“CLSI”) was a “narrow one” and in their
opinion, the Court planned to “tread carefully in such cases” so as not to “embarrass the future.” 111
The crux of the Court’s reasoning was that “location tracking reveals a host of intimate details
about private associations and activities.”112 Contact tracing applications, location monitoring,
and other epidemiological surveillance programs that prove to be robust enough to document
disease progression using aggregate data will trigger the concerns observed in Carpenter.113
Although defended on grounds of urgent need to contend with the present health crises, the
variation of digital contact tracing efforts raise significant cause for concern given their potential
for abuse. Despite potential public health benefits, it is not entirely clear that digital contact tracing
can achieve its aim of curbing the virus without imposing disproportionate privacy harms. It is
not without acknowledging that the explosive growth of COVID-19 in the United States alone
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“crippled American life and the economy,” thus triggering an increased interest in “harnessing the
power of [technology] to track, predict, and control the pandemic.”114 Despite this desperation for
a quick fix, policy makers in partnership with technology developers must weigh the comparative
advantages of location tracking against a more traditional means of controlling a pandemic, taking
into account serious threats to privacy, metrics that will determine success in implementing digital
contact-tracing models, and set plans for sunsetting the data at the end of the public health crisis.115
C. Voluntariness and Consent
For contact tracing apps and exposure notification systems to work, it is critical that enough
people trust the app to install it and provide highly personal information to help accurately track
the spread of the virus. Implementation of the app “must have a higher ‘transmission rate’ than
the virus itself for it to be effective. 116 Providing stronger privacy protection would likely
encourage voluntary adoption, a choice made by a user’s free will rather than through coercion
coerced.117 For contact-tracing apps to be truly voluntary, the following must be the user’s free
choice: the decision to carry a smartphone, the decision to download the app, the decision to leave
the app operating on the device at all times, the decision to react to its alerts, and the decision to
share the contact logs when tested positive. 118 Heightened public anxiety surrounding the privacy
concerns ultimately impedes voluntariness, though. If not enough of the population downloads a
proposed contact tracing app, the effectiveness of said app is squandered. On the other hand, if
the app’s use is mandated, this is equally problematic as it amounts to indirect coercion. An Oxford
University study suggested “at least 60% of a country’s population would need to use an app” to
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stop the spread of the virus.119 In the United States, a survey by the Washington Post-University
of Maryland found only about half of Americans who own smartphones would be willing to use
the Google/Apple ENS framework.120
Voluntariness blends with the element of consent as well. While many people are willing to
consent to health systems to use their personal data to track exposure, “consent is not the optimal
basis for public authorities. Consent given to public authorities is generally not considered to be
given freely due to the power or potential power of public agencies to compel compliance.”121 In
the U.S., nearly three in five people are not willing to download and use a contact-tracing app due
to the mistrust of tech companies and their willingness (or lack thereof) to safeguard privacy.122 If
Google/Apple begins partnering with governments, requiring explicit consent supports autonomy
over users’ personal information and further limits what data is controlled and how long it is
retained.123 Nonconsensual tracking by law enforcement increases the risks that a government
agency will abuse their authority by using public health data beyond the scope of its intended
purpose. This would be detrimental to the trust and relationship between the government and the
public.
D. Exit Strategy
It is imperative that a well designed contact-tracing solution, designed to combat a viral
outbreak, be paired with strict sunsetting provisions. While the implementation of digitized
contact-tracing applications is beneficial for the efficiency of tracking mass groups of individuals,
once a tool like this is operational, it is tempting to store information and use it to develop strategies
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for future infectious diseases. Implementing these technologies and designing them with the future
in mind will likely lead to changes in our laws governing civil rights. Despite this, “justice and
autonomy in patient-care . . . should not be forsaken,” even amidst a pandemic. 124 To that end,
healthcare interventions by tech developers must be transparent about “the roadmap to scaling”
and implementing digital-contact tracing efforts when it requires such a “comprehensive sociopolitical buy-in.”125 The suspicions circulating about contact-tracing efforts and applications could
have “a cost measured in lives.”126 If there is insufficient participation in tracking, the ongoing
collection efforts suffer. Such suspicious are rooted in the ambiguities about whether or not there
is a plan to sunset the data individuals are contributing. Minus assurances of privacy protection
measures by tech developers creating decentralized models, there has not been a clearly defined
exit strategy for when the pandemic ends.
IV.

Current Privacy Law: HIV/AIDS Comparison and Legal Framework

A. HIV Contact-Tracing
In the infectious disease context, the justification for contact tracing is that in “requiring
scientific evidence that the person actually has an infectious condition, that circumstances exist
whereby the infection can be communicated,” then that “measure would be effective in eliminating
or reducing the risk of contagion.”127 Traditional contact tracing efforts trace back to sixteenth
century Europe when even then it was a governmental responsibility for public health
authorities.128 At the turn of the twentieth century, the HIV/AIDS epidemic presented new
challenges for public health officials. From the epidemic’s inception, patient-confidentiality in the
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context of contact tracing resurfaced and met a new level of intensity. At this time, however, the
public health response focused primarily on individual responsibility. In the context, of HIV,
health departments interviewed infected patients (“index cases”) who would voluntarily disclose
names of past and present sexual partners who were then traced in order to be notified of their
potential exposure.129 Because of prevailing social mores that keep sexually transmitted diseases
(STDs) out of the eyeline of public consciousness, the spread of STDs typically do not receive
effective intervention.130 Secrecy and individual privacy were a “prevailing social construct of
public health,”131 and with regard to AIDS, the disease fostered “ominous fantasies . . . that is a
marker of both individual and social vulnerabilities.” 132

To “pierce the veil of secrecy”

surrounding these diseases, one of the earliest strategies for STD prevention was “sexual contact tracing” in the form of two models: patient referral and provider referral.133 The use of contacttracing per these arrangements are limited. Because of the “deep intrusion into private matters that
tracing involves and the great stigma that is associated with HIV infection,” contact -tracing
without strict confidentiality laws disincentivize transparency about having the condition. 134 In
1987, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) set guidelines regarding HIV contacttracing, stating, “If [people infected with HIV] are unwilling to notify their partners . . . physicians
or health department personnel should use confidential procedures to assure that the partners are
notified.”135 The most pressing issue involved in this contact tracing scheme is the “invasion of
the constitutional right of informational privacy and the potentially discouraging effect on risk-
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reduction behavior resulting from contact tracing.”136 The unwarranted and unprotected disclosure
of HIV-related information, while important to curb the spread and protect lives of those who may
be at risk, raises an expectation for privacy as it implicates one’s constitutional right to keep certain
personal information private.137
In the modern context, many have expressed privacy concerns regarding digital contact tracing
solutions and the loss of agency. Since the first reported AIDS case, sociologists interviewed
patients and documented environmental factors that would later help the CDC determine the cause
of the immunodeficiency—a virus, and not chemicals or recreational drug use as initially
believed.138 The development of trust between patients and sociologists was crucial in acquiring
this information. Trust and participation of the community are imperative to effective, large-scale
contact tracing efforts that garner qualitative data to understand how a virus spread s between
contacts and risk factors that make others more susceptible. 139 Naturally, digital contact tracing
apps make this more difficult, especially those that employ a centralized model or use location
tracking. Without patients’ trust and consent to share data, progress in stopping the spread of
COVID-19 could face heavy consequences of relying too much on technology as the solution. In
the U.S., especially with such limited trust in leadership and the current administration, asking the
public to put trust in large tech companies like Apple and Google is a tall order.
V.

Solution/Conclusion

As society progresses and as the intuitive technology development sector continues to flourish,
it is inevitable that privacy-aware solutions be designed and integrated to fulfill the objectives of
contact-tracing in a digital context in the face of a global pandemic. The main problem facing these
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new solutions is a mass consensus to trust technology developers and their role in the scope of
contact tracing. One thing is clear, mass surveillance models like those deployed in China, South
Korea, Israel, and Singapore will be entirely unworkable in the United States. The United States
is pressed to adopt some form of a national contact-tracing framework as well as enhanced testing
strategies to balance the needs of public health while respecting individual liberties. In evaluating
the differences between decentralized and centralized models of digital contact tracing apps, a
decentralized framework is less threatening to the various privacy risks to which digital contacttracing opens the door. The Apple/Google ENS proposal and partnership with public health
officials is a good start, but utility of the framework will depend on reliability of diagnosis
information and the availability of COVID-19 testing. Only with these complementary capacities
can exposure notification and contact-tracing manifest further as a proportionate response to
COVID-19 management and moreover justifies a level of intrusion on individuals’ privacy rights.
Additionally, there should be “incentive mechanisms” built into the applications beyond opting-in
and opting-out.140

Because user participation is so crucial to the effectiveness of these

applications, incentivizing such participation by utilizing an app that requires explicit consent,
encourages voluntariness, and strictly limits what data is collected to only that which is entirely
necessary and preventing use of any surveillance tool for either political or economic purposes is
crucial. Government authorities must monitor their contact tracing system to prevent against
function creep,141 such that the data is not kept after the public health crisis ceases. Finally, privacy
requirement in the form of legislation would be beneficial so a user can disclose necessary
information to public health officials without facing social embarrassment or discrimination. Such
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a legal instrument could establish accountability mechanisms, ensuring private use of the data is
appropriately responsive to public concerns and democratic principles. 142
Effective digital contact tracing can be a highly effective step towards containing future
outbreaks. There is a variety of digital technologies unveiling around the world to help curb the
spread of the virus, but that simultaneously harm privacy.143 Some of the frameworks, like the
Apple Google ENS proposal, have been designed with privacy and security in mind. 144 The
decentralized architecture does not report information about contacts or connections a user’s
device has made to a central server but rather stores such data on each individual’s device.145 This
framework ensures protection of users’ privacy by allowing users full control over the ENS
system,146 by not sharing geographic location with the government, and by preserving users’
identities if they test positive.147 However, security concerns still remain, leaving users vulnerable
to risk of overreach and other privacy violations.148 Further protections should be afforded to users
by ensuring that the data being analyzed is accurate and that there is heightened transparency from
the government and tech developers. The success of any digital contact tracing app depends fully
on trust, reliability, and widespread use. In order to be considered as an operative public-health
tool for future pandemics, safeguarding privacy must be the first step in devising contact-tracing
solutions.149 Moving forward, there are three critical privacy risks that must be mitigated:
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indefinite storage of COVID-19 personal data; repurposing COVID-19 data for uses unrelated to
managing the public health crisis; and unauthorized access to COVID-10 personal data by any
entity without legitimate need related to the current public health crisis. 150 To respond to these
risks, digital contact tracing solutions must be designed to make sensible trade-offs between
competing priorities of managing the public health crisis and protecting privacy. Beyond the
design of the apps themselves, the U.S. needs a baseline federal privacy law to establish clear and
enforceable privacy rules that protects users personal information, especially in times of crisis.
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